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CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: BROADENING THE CRITERIA FOR
DEFINING CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002)
Matthew C. Brewer* ""
Petitioner was convicted of abduction, armed robbery, and capital
murder,' and sentenced to death.2 Petitioner appealed to the Virginia
Supreme Court,3 asserting that he was not eligible for the death penalty
under Virginia law4 because he was mentally retarded.5 The Virginia
Supreme Court rejected Petitioner's argument6 and affirmed the imposition

* To my wife Cate, for everything.
** Editor's Note: This case comment received the George W. Milam award for the best case

comment written in Fall 2002.
1. Atkins v. Commonwealth, 510 S.E.2d 445, 451 (Va. 1999), aJfd, 534 S.E.2d 312, 321
(Va. 2000), rev'd sub nom. Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2252 (2002). Petitioner, Daryl
Renard Atkins, with William Jones, abducted Eric Michael Nesbitt at gunpoint, robbed him, and
ultimately drove him to an isolated location where Petitioner shot Nesbitt eight times, killing him.
See id. at 166-67.
2. Id. at 172. During the trial's penalty phase, the State proved the existence of two
aggravating factors necessary for the jury to pass a death sentence: future dangerousness to society
and vileness of the offense. Id.
3. Atkins v. Commonwealth, 534 S.E.2d 312, 314 (Va. 2000), rev'd sub noma. Atkins v.
Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002). This was Petitioner's second appeal to the Virginia Supreme
Court. Id. at 378. In the first appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court upheld the conviction, but ordered
a resentencing hearing because the trial court had issued a misleading verdict form. Atkins, 510
S.E.2d at 457.
4. Atkins, 534 S.E.2d at 318. Petitioner cited Virginia law, which provides that when a death
sentence is imposed, the court is required to determine "[w]hether the sentence of death is excessive
or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the
defendant." VA. STAT. ANN. § 17.1-313(c) (2002). Petitioner claimed the death penalty, as applied
to him, was disproportionate because he was mentally retarded. Atkins, 534 S.E.2d at 318-19.
5. Atkins, 534 S.E.2d at 318-19. Petitioner relied on a forensic psychologist, Dr. Nelson,
who testified that Petitioner, though competent to stand trial, was mildly mentally retarded. Id. Dr.
Nelson testified that Petitioner, because of his low IQ (full-scale IQ of 59) and diminished capacity
to function independently, satisfied the American Psychiatric Association's criteria for mild mental
retardation. Id.
6. Id.at 321. The Virginia Supreme Court based its decision explicitly on the United States
Supreme Court's ruling in Penryv. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,340 (1989), that the Eighth Amendment
does not categorically prohibit the execution of mentally retarded criminals. Atkins, 534 S.E.2d at
318-19.
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of the death penalty.7 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari8
and, in reversing the decision of the Virginia Supreme Court, HELD, that
executions of mentally retarded criminals are considered cruel and unusual
punishment and are therefore prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.9
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual
punishments, but it does not explicitly define cruel and unusual."
Nevertheless, the Court has established that the determination of whether
a punishment is cruel and unusual is not limited to a consideration of what
would have been cruel and unusual at the time the Bill of Rights was
adopted." Rather, the Court has declared that the definition of cruel and
unusual punishment is an evolving standard, to be determined by
contemporary societal notions of decency. 2 In addition, the Court has
recognized that its own judgment plays a role in identifying modem
standards of decency.' 3 As the Court's definition of cruel and unusual has
evolved, so has the evidence that the Court has been willing to examine in
assessing modem standards of decency. In Trop v. Dulles," the Court, for
the first time, considered the practices of other nations in defining
American standards of cruel and unusual punishment."
In Trop, the Court considered whether taking away a soldier's
citizenship for the crime of wartime desertion was cruel and unusual
punishment. 6 Petitioner, a private in the United States Army stationed
overseas during World War II, escaped from a stockade where he had been
imprisoned for a prior breach of discipline. 7 Petitioner was found and
arrested the following day, and was subsequently convicted of desertion

7. Atkins, 534 S.E.2d at 321.
8. Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 2246 (2002).

9. Id. at 2252.
10. The Eighth Amendment states: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
11. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,405-06 (1986). The Court ruled that while the Eighth
Amendment clearly banned punishments that would have been considered cruel and unusual at the
time the Bill of Rights was adopted, its proscriptions "are not limited to those practices condemned
by the common law in 1789." Id. at 406.
12. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). The Court stated that "[tihe [Eighth]
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society." Id.
13. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977). The Court stated that "the Constitution
contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the
acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment." Id.But see id. at 592 ("Eighth
Amendment judgments should not be, or appear to be, merely the subjective views of individual
Justices; judgment should be informed by objective factors to the maximum possible extent.").
14. 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion).
15. Id. at 102-03.
16. Id. at 87.
17. Id.
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at a general court-martial." Though Petitioner had never aligned himself
with a foreign sovereignty, he was dishonorably discharged, and, as a
result, stripped of his U.S. citizenship. 9
The Court analyzed the constitutionality of Petitioner's
denationalization with the underlying assumption that the Eighth
Amendment's primary function is to preserve human dignity.2" In this
context, the Court held that, based on current societal standards,
Petitioner's denationalization constituted cruel and unusual punishment.2'
In reaching this conclusion, the Court expressly considered the standards
of all "civilized" nations.22 Thus, in Trop, the Court exhibited a willingness
to allow international standards of decency to influence the meaning of
cruel and unusual punishment under the United States Constitution.23
In a patent rejection of the Trop approach, the Court, in Stanford v.
Kentucky,24 refused to consider international opinion in determining
whether the execution of a seventeen-year-old was unconstitutional.25 In
Stanford, Petitioner was sentenced to death for a murder he committed
while a minor.26 Petitioner appealed his conviction, arguing that the
execution of minors was contrary to current societal standards of decency,
and thus constituted cruel and unusual punishment. As evidence of
societal standards of decency, Petitioner asked the Court to consider the
sentencing practices of other countries,2" public opinion polls, 29 the views

18. Id. at 88. Petitioner was sentenced to three years of hard labor, with forfeiture of all pay
and allowances, and dishonorably discharged. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 100. The Court stated that "[t]he basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment
is nothing less than the dignity of man." Id.
21. Id. at 103-04.
22. Id. at 102-03. The Court described denationalization as "a fate universally decried by
civilized people," and as "a condition deplored in the international community of democracies."
Id. at 102. In addition, the Court referred to a United Nations report, which revealed that only two
of eighty-four nations surveyed imposed denationalization as a penalty for desertion. Id. at 103.
23. See id. at 102-04. Though Trop was aplurality opinion, neither of the concurring opinions
objected to the consideration of foreign nations' policies. Id. at 104-14 (Black, J., concurring)
(Brennan, J., concurring). Moreover, the dissent also specifically referred to international policies
to rebut the plurality's opinion. Id. at 126 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
24. 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (plurality opinion).
25. Id. at 370n.l.
26. Id. at 365-66. Petitioner was seventeen-years and four-months-old when he committed
murder, first-degree sodomy, and first-degree robbery, and received stolen property, for which he
was convicted and sentenced to death. Id. at 366.
27. Id. at 368-69.
28. Id. at 370 n.j. The Court rejected "the contention of petitioners and their various

amici... that the sentencing practices of other countries are relevant." Id. This footnote isthe only
indication that Petitioner asked the Court to consider practices of foreign countries.
29. Id. at 377.
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of interest groups,3" and the positions of various relevant professional

associations. 3

In denying Petitioner's appeal, the Court reaffirmed that cruel and
unusual punishments were to be defined by evolving standards of
decency.32 The Court stated emphatically, however, that only American
notions of decency, not the practices of other nations, were to be
considered.33 The Court elaborated upon its refusal to consider foreign
practices by articulating two categories of evidence that could be trusted
as objective indicators of American societal standards: statutes enacted by
state legislatures34 and, to a lesser degree, the application of those statutes
in jury sentences.35 Confirming its position, the Court also rejected
Petitioner's request that it consider public opinion poll data and the views
of interest groups and professional associations.36
The dissent, on the contrary, agreed with Petitioner that the Court
should have considered such supplementary evidence as the official views
of professional and religious organizations, and the policies of other
nations.37 Nevertheless, the Court rejected this argument, and upheld
Petitioner's death sentence based solely on its consideration of
contemporary state laws and jury sentences. 3" The Court applied the same
evidential limitation in Penry v.Lynaugh,39 this time to determine the
constitutionality of executing a mentally retarded criminal.4 0
In Penry,Petitioner was sentenced to death after confessing to the rape
and murder of a woman in her home. 4 Petitioner appealed his sentence,
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See id. at 369.
33. Id. at 370 n. 1. The Court emphasized that "it is American conceptions of decency that
are dispositive.. ." and that the practices of other nations "cannot serve to establish the first Eighth
Amendment prerequisite, that [a] practice is accepted among our people." Id.
34. Id. at 370. "'[F]irst' among the 'objective indicia that reflect the public attitude toward
a given sanction' are statutes passed by society's elected representatives." Id. (quoting McCleskey
v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987)).
35. See id. at 373-74.
36. Id.at 377. The Court "decline[d] the invitation to rest constitutional law upon such
uncertain foundations." Id.
37. Id. at 388-90 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the Court "begin[s] the
task of deciding whether a punishment is unconstitutional by reviewing legislative enactments and
the work of sentencing juries . . ." but that a complete assessment should include other

"ethicoscientific" evidence. Id. at 383. The dissent continued, "[the views of organizations with
expertise in relevant fields and the choices of governments elsewhere in the world also merit our
attention as indicators whether a punishment is acceptable in a civilized society." Id. at 384.
38. Id. at 380. Considering only these factors, the Court ruled that there was no national
consensus that the execution of minors constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Id.
39. 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989) (plurality opinion).
40. Id. at 307.
41. See id. at 307-12. The jury rejected Petitioner's insanity plea, and, having found the
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arguing that, because he was mildly mentally retarded,4 2 his execution
would violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment.4 3 At the time, only one state, Georgia," prohibited the
execution of mentally retarded offenders, and Petitioner provided no
evidence of jury sentencing statistics to establish current societal moral
standards.45 Instead, Petitioner offered several public opinion surveys
expressing strong opposition to the execution of the mentally retarded.'
The Court rejected this supplementary evidence, and, consequently,
determining that there was insufficient proof of a national consensus
against executing mentally retarded criminals, 47 upheld Petitioner's death
sentence.4
Justifying its decision, the Court rejected the proposition that public
opinion surveys and the views of professional organizations were reliable
indicators of societal standards of decency. 49 Moreover, the Court's
rejection of this supplementary evidence was unanimous, as none of the
three dissenting opinions advocated the consideration of such evidence."5
However, the Court left open the possibility of reconsidering its ruling '

presence of three required aggravating factors, sentenced him to death. Id.
42. See id. at 307-09. In a competency hearing and at trial several clinical psychologists
testified that Petitioner's IQ of 54 was low enough to designate him as being mildly mentally
retarded, but that he also knew right from wrong and was competent to stand trial. Id.
43. Id. at 312.
44. Id. at 334.
45. See id.

46. Id. at 334-35. Petitioner offered survey data from Texas, Florida, and Georgia, showing
that, respectively, 73%, 71%, and 66% of those states' citizens were opposed to executing the
mentally retarded. Id.
47. Id. at 335. In addition to Georgia, Maryland's legislature had passed a bill, not yet in
force, prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded criminals. Id. at 334. The Court concluded that
these two states, "even when added to the 14 States that have rejected capital punishment
completely, do not provide sufficient evidence at present of a national consensus." Id.
48. Id. at 340.
49. See id. at 334-35. The Court's distrust of alternative evidence is revealed by it specifically
approving only state laws and jury sentences. See id. at 331. The Court stated that "[t]he clearest
and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the
country's legislatures. We have also looked to data concerning the actions of sentencing juries."
Id. at 331.
50. See id. at 341-49 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 349-50
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 350-60 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part
and dissenting in part). But cf Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 383-84 (1989) (plurality
opinion) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (dissenting opinion in acompanion case advocating consideration
of supplementary evidence).
51. Penry, 492 U.S. at 340. The Court acknowledged that "a national consensus against
execution of the mentally retarded may someday emerge ....
"Id.
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if the public sentiment against executing the mentally retarded expressed
in opinion polls ever made its way into state legislation. 2
Like the Court in Penry,the instant Court looked to state law statistics
to ascertain whether contemporary societal standards of decency
prohibited executing the mentally retarded.53 Unlike Penry, the instant
Court held that current standards of decency prohibited the execution of
mentally retarded criminals. 4 In reaching its decision, the instant Court
analyzed how state legislatures had responded to the Penry decision
thirteen years earlier." The majority noted that since Penry,of the thirtyeight states that permit capital punishment, the number that prohibit the
execution of mentally retarded criminals had risen from two to eighteen. 6
Although this number amounts to only forty-seven percent of the states
that allow capital punishment, the majority accepted these statistics as
proof that societal standards of decency had shifted since Penry, and now
justified prohibiting the execution of the mentally retarded." The Court
bolstered its ruling by citing sentencing statistics which showed that, even
in states that allow mentally retarded criminals to be sentenced to death,
such sentences by juries are rare.5
In justifying its ruling, the instant Court did not stop at a consideration
of state laws and jury sentences.59 The instant Court cited, as evidence of
societal consensus, the consistency with which states that once allowed the
execution of mentally retarded criminals were reversing their positions.'
52. Id. at 355. The Court stated that "[tihe public sentiment expressed in these and other polls
and resolutions may ultimately find expression in legislation, which is an objective indicator of
contemporary values upon which we can rely." Id.
53. See Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2247-49 (2002).
54. Id. at 2252.
55. Id. at 2248.
56. Id. At the time of the instant case, states allowing the death penalty, but not for the

mentally retarded, included: Arkansas, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Indiana,
Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, and Washington. Id. In addition, Texas had adopted a similar bill that had yet
to take effect. Id. at 2248-49.
57. Id. at 2252.
58. See id.at 2249. "[Ejven among those States that regularly execute offenders and that have
no prohibition with regard to the mentally retarded, only five have executed offenders possessing
a known IQ less than 70 since we decided Penry." Id.
59. See id. at 2249 & n.21.
60. Id.
It is not so much the number of these States that is significant, but the consistency
of the direction of change. Given the well-known fact that anticrime legislation
is far more popular than legislation providing protections for persons guilty of
violent crime, the large number of States prohibiting the execution of mentally
retarded persons ...provides powerful evidence that today our society views
mentally retarded offenders as categorically less culpable than the average
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The instant Court also considered the large margins by which legislatures
had voted to repeal statutes allowing the execution of mentally retarded

criminals.6 Finally, the instant Court referred to a class of supporting
evidence it had explicitly rejected in both Stanford and Penry: the official

positions of professional and religious organizations, the consensus
opinion of the world community, and public opinion polling data.62 The

instant Court did, however, state that it did not consider this supporting

evidence to be dispositive.63
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas,
criticized the majority's methodology in a potent dissent." Chief Justice
Rehnquist, after reiterating that state laws and jury sentences were the only
reliable evidence of societal values,65 questioned the majority's wisdom in

considering unverifiable opinion poll data." He reminded the majority that
the Court had expressly declined to consider public polling data over state
law statistics in Penry.67 Chief Justice Rehnquist took particular exception
to the instant majority's renewed willingness to consider international
opinion."' While he conceded that the Court had referted to international
opinion in previous cases,69 he pointed out that this had been done only to
reinforce conclusions already substantiated by state law and sentencing

criminal.
Id.
61. Id."The evidence carries even greater force when it is noted that the legislatures that have
addressed the issue [of repealing the death penalty for the mentally retarded] have voted
overwhelmingly in favor of the proposition." Id.
62. Id. at 2249 n.21.
63. Id.
64. See id. at 2252-56. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
65. See id. at 2253-54 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 2252-54 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). "[W]e lack sufficient information to conclude
that the surveys were conducted in accordance with generally accepted scientific principles or are
capable of supporting valid empirical inferences about the issue before us." Id. at 2253 (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting).
67. See id. at 2255 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The Penry court reasoned that if such
opinion polls were accurate barometers of public consensus, the sentiment expressed in them would
ultimately find its way into state law. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989) (plurality
opinion).
68. Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2254 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). "Ifail to see, however, how the
views of other countries regarding the punishment of their citizens provide any support for the
Court's ultimate determination." Id.
69. Id. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988) (finding a national
consensus that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of a fifteen-year-old murderer);
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796, n.22 (1982) (finding a national consensus that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits capital punishment for unintended homicide); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 596 n. 10 (1977) (finding a national consensus that the Eighth Amendment prohibits capital
punishment for the crime of rape).
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statistics.7" Furthermore, argued Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court had
explicitly rejected the notion that international practices have any role to
play in determining United States constitutional law.7 ,
In a separate, scathing dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, accused the majority of ruling based on its
own personal views, rather than the Court's prior Eighth Amendment

jurisprudence and contemporary societal standards.7 2 Justice Scalia first
condemned the majority's analysis of current state law statistics, pointing
out that past courts, as proof of national consensus, had required a
considerably larger proportion of states to have enacted equivalent laws

than the forty-seven percent in the instant case.

3

Justice Scalia also

condemned the majority's reliance on current trends in state law, warning

that because they often turn around, trends short of an actual majority
consensus form a precarious foundation for constitutional adjudication. 74
He particularly disagreed with the majority's consideration of the views

of professional and religious organizations. Justice Scalia concluded by
asserting that the instant Court, in further restricting the states' capacity to
administer capital punishment, had taken a step toward the general
abolition of the death penalty.76

70. See Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2254 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
71. See id.At 2254; see supra note 33.
72. Id. at 2256 (Scalia, J., dissenting). It would be difficult to overstate the scorn leveled by
Justice Scalia at the majority's reasoning. He began his dissent by stating:
Today's decision is the pinnacle of our Eighth Amendment death-is-different
jurisprudence. Not only does it, like all of that jurisprudence, find no support in
the text or history of the Eighth Amendment; it does not even have support in
current social attitudes regarding the conditions that render an otherwisejust death
penalty inappropriate. Seldom has an opinion of this Court rested so obviously
upon nothing but the personal views of its members.
Id.
73. Id. at 2262 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). For comparison, Justice Scalia noted that, in previous
cases, the Court had found a consensus when the proportion of states agreeing on a specific issue
was: 58% (see Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding capital punishment for
minors)); 70%(see Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987) (upholding capital punishment for felony
murder)); 100% (see Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (prohibiting capital punishment of
the insane)); and 78% (see Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982)(prohibiting capital punishment
when homicide was committed with no intent to kill)). Atkins, 122 S.Ct. at 2262 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
74. See Atkins at 2262-63 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
75. Id. at 2264 (Scalia, J., dissenting). "[Tihe Prize for the Court's Most Feeble Effort to
fabricate 'national consensus' must go to its appeal (deservedly relegated to a footnote) to the views
of assorted professional and religious organizations, members of the so-called 'world community,'
and respondents to opinion polls." Id.
76. Id. at 2267 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). "There is something to be said for popular abolition
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In its consideration of new, and formerly unacceptable, kinds of
evidence, the instant Court has broadened the criteria for defining cruel
and unusual punishment.' Where previously the Court took into account
only the actual number of states that had passed laws similar to one
another,7" the instant Court would now also consider the margins of victory
by which those laws passed in each state's legislature."" In addition, the
instant Court resurrected a previously abandoned form of evidence:
statistics showing a trend in which states, though not yet amounting to a
majority, are consistently changing their views.80 The Court's novel
recognition of vote-margin evidence,8 combined with its acceptance of
data indicating a current trend,82 could bring about a Court that responds
too quickly to short-term changes in public opinion. 3 Such hasty
decisionmaking could, as warned by Justice Scalia, result in Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence that is soon incongruous with genuine public
opinion. 4
Similarly, the instant Court's validation of the views of professional
and religious groups, public opinion polls, and international opinion could
lead to less predictable Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.8 5 Historically,
state legislatures could determine whether the punishments they enacted
would satisfy constitutional requirements by merely examining current
state laws and jury sentencing statistics.8 6 If, in the future, however, the
of the death penalty; there is nothing to be said for its incremental abolition by this Court." Id.
77. See id. at 2248-52 (Rehnquist C.J., dissenting).
78. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
79. See supra note 61.
80. See supra note 60. This, as Justice Scalia points out, is a complete reversal of the Court's
view about the reliability of trends. Id. at 2263 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
81. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
83. See id. at 2263 (Scalia, J., dissenting). "[lit is 'myopic to base sweeping constitutional
principles upon the narrow experience of [a few] years."' Id. (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 614 (1977) (plurality opinion) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
84. Id. at 2263-64 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia based his warning on a similar
caution issued by instant majority member Justice O'Connor in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
815, 855 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (prohibiting the execution of a fifteen-year-old
murderer). In Thompson, Justice O'Connor discussed the Court's decision not to respond to a recent
national trend indicating a decline in death penalty sentences, which later reversed itself. Id. at 84855 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor stated, "[tihe mistaken premise of the decision
would have been frozen into constitutional law, making it difficult to refute and even more difficult
to reject." Id.
85. See Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2255 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Referring specifically to the
views of organizations, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated, "[flor the Court to rely on such data today
serves only to illustrate its willingness to proscribe by judicial fiat-at the behest of private
organizations speaking only for themselves-a punishment about which no across-the-board
consensus has developed through the workings of normal democratic processes ..... Id.
86. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302
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Court upholds its legitimization of evidence such as public opinion polls
and international opinion, assessing societal standards of decency would
become considerably more complicated. Consequently, state legislatures
could find it more difficult to predict whether a particular punishment
would withstand a constitutional challenge. The potential significance of
this ruling on Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is reflected in the
vehemence of both Chief Justice Rehnquist's and Justice Scalia's
dissents. 7
The instant Court's reasoning not only enlarges the class of evidence
deemed acceptable for determining societal values, it also increases the
weight afforded that evidence. Since the Trop Court's consideration of
international opinion, 9 the Court has referred to such supplementary
evidence only to bolster conclusions already supported by state laws and
jury sentencing practices.' In contrast, the instant Court found the
existence of a national consensus9 when not even a majority of death
penalty states prohibited the execution of mentally retarded criminals.92
This suggests that the supplementary evidence, as opposed to merely
bolstering an already established consensus, may have actually tipped the
scales in the instant case.93 If so, the instant Court has given more weight
to supplementary evidence than it had in any previous case, including
94
Trop.
The Trop Court's reliance on international opinion was in the
determination of the constitutionality of an exclusively federal
punishment, denationalization, for which there were no state laws or
sentencing statistics for the Court to consider.95 Consequently, the
consideration of such supplemental evidence in Trop neither bolstered nor
weakened evidence of a national consensus." The instant Court, however,
considered supplemental evidence that was, if not contrary to, at least not
clearly congruent with state laws and jury sentencing data.9' This suggests
that the instant Court has afforded greater weight to such supplemental
evidence than has any previous Court.

(1989).
87. See Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2252-2268 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

88. See id. at 2255 (Rehnquist C.J., dissenting).
89. See supra note 22.
90. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
91. Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2249.

92.
93.
94.
95.

See id. at 2261-62. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2248-49.
See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 88-90 (1958).
Id.

96. See id. at 98-103.

97. See Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2248-52 (Rehnquist C.J., dissenting).
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The instant Court's ruling has broadened the criteria for defining cruel
and unusual punishment. This may, as Justice Scalia asserted in his
dissent, represent the Court's substitution of its own personal views for
those of the American public.9" However, in light of the Court's previous
admonishments against just this kind of substitution," it is unlikely that the
majority would base its decision solely on personal beliefs. Rather, the
Court's willingness to consider and give substantial weight to such
previously unacceptable supplemental evidence may signal its desire to
bring the United States' Eighth Amendment jurisprudence more in line
with international standards."° If the latter is true, the constitutionality of
the death penalty itself may come into question in the future.

98. See supra note 72.
99. See supra note 13.
100. See generally Amnesty International, US Supreme Court decision in Atkins vs. Virginia
to Bring US in Line with International Standards of Decency (June 20, 2002), available at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/2002/usa06202002.html.
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